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ABSTRACT: In the middle of the heated debate on how to reverse climate change, some 
countries in Eastern Europe are returning to extractive industries and the exploitation of natural 
resources to finance their national budgets. The paper looks at mobilization in one locality in 
Romania and the Czech Republic and investigates the radically different pattern of mobilization 
in these two otherwise similar areas. Whereas in many Romanian cities affected by this 
economic “transformation,” citizens have protested against it, as in Câmpeni with regard to the 
Roșia Montană gold mining project, in the Czech Republic, however, the extension of coal 
extraction was hardly opposed by the general population, with the exception of environmental 
groups. Using critical political economy approach, the paper explores the interaction between 
the economic changes, politics, and citizens' reactions and argues that the difference in 
outcome can be explained by the configuration of the economic organization, and the dominant 
“social blocks” that sustain it, in each of the areas considered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the middle of the heated debate on how to reverse climate change and global 
warming, some countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America are returning to 
extractive industries and the exploitation of natural resources (coal and gold mining, 
gas extraction, and timber growing and harvesting, in particular) to finance their 
national and regional budgets. These industries and the economic interests behind 
them have an essential impact on the lives, environment, and politics of the areas in 
which they are located. The aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of these changes 
on the national economic model in two different areas, and examine the attendant 
strategies in relation to local politics and urban–rural conflicts. It looks at two localities 
in two Eastern European countries, Romania and the Czech Republic, which recently 
returned to the extraction of natural resources as means to finance public investment 
and government budgets. The paper investigates the interaction between the 
economic changes, politics, and citizens’ reactions. Whereas in many Romanian cities 
affected by this economic “transformation” citizens have protested strongly against it, 
as in Câmpeni with regard to the Roșia Montană gold mining project, in the Czech 
Republic, the extension of extraction and the lifespan of mines were not met with a 
great deal of opposition from the general public, with the exception of environmental 
groups. 
What were the effects of the return to extractive industries on local politics and 
urban–rural conflicts in these two areas? More notably, why were there mobilizations 
opposing such changes in one case and not the other? This paper deals with two 
localities in two countries with similar macroeconomic conditions but different 
outcomes. Whereas in Romania the extractivist turn of the government was opposed 
firmly by large-scale protests staged in many cities, in the Czech Republic the 
opposition was minor and focused only on the affected localities. Given the similar 
starting conditions and the similar threat to natural and urban habitats, the question 
the paper asks is: what accounts for the different magnitude of the responses? 
This paper combines theories of social movements with critical political economy. 
Concretely, it uses the framework developed by Cini et al. (2017), which links the 
distinct process of accumulation in the economy with the type of social movements 
that can potentially arise from such a process. The paper aims to continue the debate 
by focusing on how the transformation processes of social and economic structures 
have shaped the opening (or closure) of political opportunities and affected the 
societal resonance of movement frames, the expansion (or compression) of networks, 
and the mobilization (or not) of resources. It argues that the different configuration of 
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the economic organization in the two countries, and the dominant actors or “social 
blocks” that sustain this, can shed light on the diverse development of contentious 
politics in the European periphery.  
Specifically, in the case of the Czech Republic, the more coordinated organization of 
the economy allowed for institutional accommodation of some of the protestors’ 
claims (Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Vráblíková and Císař 2014; Hall and Soskice 2001), 
and limited the protest frame to a local issue of ecology that does not resonate so well 
with Czech society. On the other hand, in Romania, the lack of coordination in the 
foreign direct investment-led (FDI) economy and a closed (captured) political system 
pushed citizens to exert extra-parliamentary pressure on political actors (Burean and 
Badescu 2014). Thus, the perception of a closed economic and political system in 
Romania led to a more vocal and radical response from citizens. According to 
Worldwide Governance Indicators collected by the World Bank, Romania has a higher 
risk of corruption than the Czech Republic.1 The protests in Roșia Montană succeeded 
mainly because the protest was not framed exclusively as an ecological issue, but also 
as opposition to a corrupt government influenced strongly by multinational companies. 
First, this paper contributes to the current debate about the “strange 
disappearance” of capitalism from social movement studies (Della Porta 2015; Hetland 
and Goodwin 2013; Krinsky 2013; Cini et al. 2017) by applying political economy and 
the concept of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 2003) to social movements in 
two specific cases of natural resources exploitation and resistance to this. Second, it 
deals with the puzzle of countries with similar starting macroeconomic conditions 
achieving different outcomes from contentious politics and contributes, in this way, to 
connecting the political economy macro-conditions with the local reality of protest. 
This paper uses a comparative case study of two instances of resistance to extractive 
industries, the case study examples being located in Romania and the Czech Republic, 
and aims to apply a similar research design to each one. Both are post-communist 
countries with a weak civil society and a current unstable political system (Parau 2009). 
Their economies receive a lot of FDI and are substantially based on the automotive 
industry. The information and data were gathered first through media analysis, and 
then by frame analysis of the newspaper articles found, some secondary literature, and 
documents issued by protesters, environmental organizations, the government, and 
mining companies for the period 2011–2015. Short periods of fieldwork were 
undertaken in Romania in September 2017 and in the Czech Republic in February 2017, 
 
1 According to Control of Corruption Indicators in 2011 and 2016 Romania ranks below the 
Czech Republic (52.61 and 58 points out of 100 compared to 67.77 points in both years). 
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during which the author consulted few participants mostly academics, who had 
provided additional insights in addition to the documents and the media.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section discusses 
concepts of extractivism, accumulation by dispossession, and the social movement 
frames; the third section deals with the argument that the different outcomes and 
protest dynamics can be explained by the different configurations of the political 
economy and the different ways in which the protests were framed in the two 
countries; the following section presents the two case studies in Romania and the 
Czech Republic; and the final section concludes by summarizing the findings and 
suggesting ideas for possible future research. 
 
2. Mobilizations in times of extractive capitalism 
 
Protests and movements concerning territory, such as anti-mining protests, local 
environmental movements and, most recently, anti-tourism protests are on the rise, 
drawing the attention of scholars. In 2013, thousands of citizens in the larger cities of 
Romania gathered to protest against the re-opening of a gold mine in a depressed rural 
area of Roșia Montană by a Canadian multinational company, Gabriel Resources. This 
project divided the local community, who were torn between wishing to welcome 
employment and wanting to preserve natural habitat. What started as a small series of 
protests against the mine became part of a larger manifestation of dissatisfaction with 
the government after the transition from Communism to democracy (referred to 
hereafter as “the transition”) and a larger series of anti-government and anti-
corruption protests resulted, forcing several prominent politicians out of office (Burean 
and Badescu 2014). After several huge rallies, the new Social Democratic government 
suspended the Roșia Montană gold mining project. 
At about the same time, in 2013, the president of the Czech Republic, Miloš Zeman, 
re-opened the debate on the future of coal mining when he publicly defended the 
abolition of restrictions on brown coal mining in the northern part of the country. 
Territorial limits for brown coal mining in northern Bohemia had been established in 
1991 to protect the environment in general and, specifically, to protect towns and 
houses from demolition due to coal extraction. Further exploitation would threaten 
residential areas and the cultural and natural heritage. However, despite the 
magnitude of possible consequences, only a minority of citizens mobilized both in favor 
and against the possible extension of mining. In 2015, the Social Democratic coalition 
government decided to selectively ease the restrictions, retaining them only where 
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drilling directly threatened the village of Horní Jiřetín. How can the difference in 
intensity and scale of the opposition to these two extractive projects be explained? 
For some, similar mobilizations seem like a specter of the past, hardly fitting in 
among the examples of new post-materialist movements. Others see them as a link 
between economic crisis and the organization of national economic models (Diani and 
Císař 2014). Della Porta has argued that social movement studies have developed a 
useful kit of concepts and theories that are well adapted for understanding social 
movements in core capitalist countries at the peak of the growth of the welfare state. 
However, they seem to be insufficient for making sense of the global contentious 
politics aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis (Della Porta 2015;2017). Della Porta 
maintains that political opportunity structures and material resources, traditional 
factors explaining the rise of contentious politics, were closed or unwelcoming, or 
missing, respectively, for the majority of protesters who flooded the streets during and 
after the crisis. According to her, the traditional allies, such as left-wing parties and 
unions, turned into opponents, implementing and supporting harsh austerity (Roberts 
2014; Della Porta 2015). 
As a result, numerous scholars reintroduced capitalism to political science and social 
movements’ research. A growing body of academics turned their attention back to the 
political economy and argued that bringing critical political economy and Marxism back 
to social movements research might provide useful precisely when current theories 
were losing their explanatory potential (Barker et al. 2013; Hetland and Goodwin 2013; 
Cini et al. 2017). According to them, the prevailing theories paid little attention to how 
and to what extent the long-term dynamics of capitalism influenced the emergence 
and decline of mobilizations (Cini et al. 2017; Navrátil and Císař 2015). Indeed, by 
excluding capitalism and class cleavages as something obsolete and outdated in the 
post-materialist age, these theories had misinterpreted several class-based movements 
and failed to account for the new ones. For example, by focusing on the emergence of 
mostly urban-based social actors, the mainstream literature ignored the impact of 
globalization and liberalization on the life of peasants and on rural communities 
(Desmarais 2002; Veltmeyer and Petras 2002). 
Cini et al. (2017) propose a framework that could complement current social 
movement theories linking the macro-structural changes of capitalist society (produced 
by the processes of accumulation in production and accumulation by dispossession) 
with the emergence of contentious politics and movements. They note a link between 
the type of accumulation process and the type of social movement that can potentially 
arise from such a process, and distinguish between movements that derive from 
accumulation in production and those that derive from accumulation by dispossession. 
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The movements triggered by the process of accumulation in production are associated 
with the struggles against the various phases of the capital cycle (production, labor, 
circulation, and consumption) within a specific capitalist model. Examples of research 
dealing with movements opposing the various phases of the capital cycle along with 
the social institutions involved in such processes can be found in Crouch (2004) or 
Streeck (2013)2. By contrast, according to Cini et al. 2017,3 the movements emerging 
from the process of accumulation by dispossession are 
 
mostly relative to the struggles against the creation of new capital investment 
opportunities; struggles that appear during the crisis of an existing model of capital 
accumulation and in the transition towards a new one. These movements emerge in 
terrains (both social and natural) where capital finds new opportunities for its 
accumulation and (re)valorization. 
 
Using this theoretical approach, the turn to extractivism in the European periphery 
and the rise of resistance to it can be better understood. Although extractive industries 
are not the dominant economic pillar in most of the Eastern European countries, they 
are still an essential complement to their FDI-dependent economies (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012; Bohle 2009). Due to the global economic crisis, the rising fiscal 
vulnerabilities of some states, and the volatile prices of commodities, many countries 
are now turning to natural resources as a source of wealth (Jessop 2011; Mezzadra and 
Gago 2017). The extractivist model is, according to Svampa, based on the appropriation 
and exploitation of the commons, it “emerges from the idea of ‘economic 
opportunities’ or ‘comparative advantages’ that would procure relatively easy money 
due to rising international prices and demand for consumer goods” (Svampa 2015b, 
67). In other words, the rising prices of gold and rare earth minerals have made natural 
 
2 Examples are the redistributive struggles, promoted by leftist parties, such as those for the crea-
tion of a public pension, healthcare, and education systems, the pillars of the welfare state. 
3
 Key examples of these movements are the “new” social movements of the 1970s and 1980s: the 
urban and student movements (Castells 1997; Cini and Guzman-Concha 2017; Harvey 2012); 
and the environmental and communitarian movements (O’Connor 1997). The feminist movement 
constitutes a particular case that could be considered as belonging to both types: first in the do-
main of production struggling for equal wage and labor conditions; but also, as Silvia Frederici 
(2004) masterly explains, as part of the framework of accumulation by dispossession pushing the 
capitalist frontier to include spheres of domesticity. If, with the new economic model, more 
women join the labor market, other women have to step in and deal with the housework and the 
provision of care for children and/or elderly relatives. 
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resources attractive for exploitation at a time when domestic consumer demand has 
slumped. 
The model of analyzing extractive industries from the viewpoint of the logic of 
accumulation by dispossession entails a deepening of the dynamic of expropriation of 
land, natural resources, and territory while producing new and dangerous forms of 
dependency and domination between and within countries (Svampa 2015). The 
extractive industries generate high environmental costs, labor-intensive but low-skilled 
jobs, international privatization of the exploitation, and a tendency to less economic 
diversification in the areas concerned, creating “sacrificial areas.” Frequently, these 
projects are imposed without the consent of local communities. This process can 
generate divisions between urban centers, which need energy, timber, revenues, or 
work in factories, and the rural areas where the extraction is taking place. In Svampa’s 
words, extractivism establishes a “vertical dynamic that occupies the territories and de-
structures regional economies, destroys biodiversity, deepens the process of social and 
economic backwardness evicting or displacing rural communities, and violates local 
processes of citizen decision-making” (Svampa 2015b, 70–71). 
One of the consequences of the contemporary rise of extractive industries is the 
explosion of socio-environmental conflicts within the communities where the new 
extraction is taking place (Vesalon and Creţan 2015; Harvey 2005, 19). At the center of 
the conflicts lie different understandings of territory and development and, ultimately, 
of the type of self-government (Tsavdaroglou, Petrakos, and Makrygianni 2017). These 
conflicts could, therefore, be characterized as movements set in motion by dynamics of 
dispossession. They challenge the creation of new capital investment models based on 
natural resources extraction. Generally speaking, these movements deploy “new forms 
of mobilization and citizen participation, centered on the defense of natural goods, 
biodiversity and the environment” (Svampa 2015a, 53). In both cases studied here, 
citizens opposed projects that had been imposed from the top down and claimed the 
right to alternative economic development that would be compatible with local 
community life. 
 
 
3. Dispossession, social movements, and economic models theories 
Returning to the initial puzzle about how the different magnitude of the protests in 
the two countries can be explained, the accumulation of dispossession framework and 
extractivism seem, however, an incomplete solution. In other words, if, in both 
localities, the dynamics of accumulation through dispossession are in place, then what 
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accounts for their difference in the contentious politics challenging these processes? 
Moreover, in both the countries in question, other factors deemed relevant in the 
literature do not differ substantially. In Romania and the Czech Republic, the Social 
Democratic coalition governments4 prompted the extraction policies and were in office 
when protests unfolded. In both cases the unions were in favor of extractive projects. 
Post-communist legacies are present, and their economies are driven mainly by FDI 
(Bohle and Greskovits 2012; Vesalon and Creţan 2015). 
In addition, the literature considers both countries as having a weak civil society and 
a protest culture (Mercea 2014; Tatar 2015). The traditional support structures were 
not in place or were secondary. As Tatar explains with regard to the Romanian case, 
demonstrations began to take place without there being any notable pre-existing 
movement organizations and they had no direct and consistent support from 
traditional mobilizing agents such as unions, professional associations, or civil society 
organizations (Tatar 2015). In fact, structures such as unions and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) were weakened and lost widespread support in both countries. 
Finally, material resources were also scarce as the austerity policies cut deep into the 
welfare state (Císař and Navrátil 2017). 
Cini et al.’s (2017) framework gives only a partial answer to these concerns. They 
recognize that the dynamics of capitalist transformations, prompted by the process of 
accumulation, affect the meso- and micro-structures of the political context in which 
social movements are embedded. Although this proposition is an important stepping 
stone, the authors remain vague and abstract as to how the different components of 
political context interact. To bridge this gap, I suggest looking at each country’s model 
of production, and the dominant social blocks that sustain each one’s organization to 
account for their potential differences and outcomes with regard to mobilization 
(Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). 
In other words, building on Cini et al. (2017), this paper argues that recent capitalist 
dynamics (economic crisis, extractivism, and FDI economic development) certainly 
have an impact on the type of movements, but one have to add other specific factors 
to the mix that influence the way social mobilizations arise. This paper argues that the 
different configuration of each country’s model of production and differences in the 
dominant actors that sustain each one’s organization can shed light on the distinct 
development of contentious politics in the European periphery (Císař and Navrátil 
 
4 The ruling Social Democratic parties in both countries (PSD in Romania and ČSSD in the 
Czech Republic) could be distinguished from the traditional left-wing parties in Western Europe 
as they were even more prone to implementing neoliberal and anti-austerity policies in both 
countries (Havlík and Voda 2016). 
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2017). Specifically, I suggest that the patterns of intermediation between interest 
groups and the executive branch, and mechanisms of demand aggregation, such as 
procedures for building effective policy coalitions, have shaped the opening (or 
closure) of political opportunities and affected the societal resonance of movement 
frames, the expansion (or compression) of networks, and the mobilization (or not) of 
resources. 
In this sense, a more coordinated political economy can accommodate economic 
concerns and claims within the formalized structure of representation, whereas a more 
fragmented and, at times, closed system is unable to channel citizens’ demands via 
institutions (closed opportunities). The fact that opportunities are closed might push 
citizens, unions, or other actors to pursue protest politics. Protests, in this sense, are 
employed as an alternative to influencing public authorities through traditional 
institutions (Cini 2017). This was the case with regard to the Romanian protests. Based 
on this, it could be expected that when a government has more fragmented relations 
with its citizens and offers them only closed opportunities, then these provoke more 
disruptive repertoires of action than when a government has more coordinated 
relations with the general public and offers them genuine opportunities for 
engagement. 
In the economic model dependent on FDI and international companies with low-
skilled workforces making labor-intensive products with a fluctuating price, companies 
are more eager to limit workers’ influence in politics (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016). 
Together with the weak political system, the lack of independent administration makes 
the state even more vulnerable to being dominated by powerful economic interests, 
while at the same time closing the political opportunity for citizens to influence these 
matters via institutional channels. Additionally, citizens have little trust in and a low 
level of satisfaction with political systems in which the power distance between them 
and the political institutions is considerable (Hofstede 2001). Under these conditions, it 
can be expected that broader frames challenging this power asymmetry and distance 
will resonate well with the population and contribute to the spread of protests and 
broader sympathies. Last, the resource and support networks tend to be influenced by 
this setting. 
In the Czech case, this article claims that a more coordinated economy and a lower 
perception of institutional domination by economic interests allowed for institutional 
accommodation of some of the protestors’ claims and limited the protest frame to a 
local issue of ecology, a topic that does not resonate so well with Czech society. In the 
Czech Republic, socio-economic concerns constituted the main party line in the new 
democratic field of party politics soon after 1989 and have remained relevant ever 
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since (Mansfeldová 2007; Kroupa et al. 2004).5 As a consequence, the Czech Republic 
has a more coordinated economic system and traditional socio-economic cleavages 
that still incorporate the conventional partners. Socio-economic interests have mainly 
been articulated by way of institutionalized politics. In this way, economic demands 
find their way into politics via institutionalized means and do not enter the protest field 
(Císař 2017; Císař and Navrátil 2017). Although protesters framed their action 
inclusively under the slogan “We are the limits,” the main frame was ecological and 
concerned with cultural heritage. These themes were used by professional NGOs; 
however, the broader population in the Czech Republic are far more concerned with 
wages and reducing corruption than with preserving the environment and their 
cultural heritage (Vráblíková and Císař 2014). 
By contrast, in Romania, protesters in the “Save Roșia Montană” campaign 
succeeded in framing the protest also as opposition to a corrupt political elite 
influenced strongly by multinational companies. The closed (captured) and volatile 
political system pushed citizens to exert extra-parliamentary pressure on political 
actors (Tatar 2015). Low state capacity and a volatile political system that has suffered 
periodic crises since the transition have limited the possibility of coherent economic 
planning and reforms, as well as the inclusion and coordination of relevant social actors 
and employers (Bohle and Greskovits 2012).6 As a result, multinational companies or 
local oligarchs, who obtained their fortunes during the transition, frequently 
dominated the administration or colluded with the government (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005; 
Dragoman 2011). This imbalance between actors increased when the Romanian 
government decided to use its natural resources as a base for the country’s economic 
recovery but offered their exploitation to large multinational companies. The 
perception of closed opportunities, unscrupulous companies, and the corrupt political 
system was prevalent, especially among urban inhabitants (Velicu 2012). 
Demonstrations involving tens of thousands of participants in dozens of locations 
across the nation were, on the face of it, about environmental safeguarding but, 
underneath, they were mostly about respecting the will of local communities, and 
corrupt decision-making (Goussev et al. 2014). According to media reports uncovered 
by the research, these protests in the major Romanian cities were directed mainly 
 
5 According to Císař and Navrátil (2017), this so-called embedded neoliberalism has been based 
on relatively generous welfare programs and, in general, “the search for compromises between 
market transformation and social cohesion.”  
6 Although weak, Romanian unions organized frequent protests; yet, as the only means of react-
ing to the legislative process they are excluded from most of the negotiations (Bohle and 
Greskovits 2012). 
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against the political establishment (Rammelt 2017). The anti-corruption frame was the 
common thread, and it proved to be an effective mobilization framework because it is 
broad enough to leave ample room for the subjective sensitivities of a large part of 
Romanian society. The most visible protests were staged by young, formerly politically-
detached people, who were manifesting a growing orientation toward law and order 
and demanding to have their share in the political process (Rammelt 2017; AFP 2016). 
The campaign also resonated with a general skepticism about the legitimate role of 
business in society and the use of natural resources (Burean and Badescu 2014). 
 
 
4. “Save Roșia Montană” in Romania and “We are the limits” in the Czech 
Republic 
 
The economic crisis, along with fluctuating prices of commodities and international 
competition from the emerging markets, pushed many countries to reconsidering their 
natural resources as a source of income. The coal and rare minerals (lithium) in the 
Czech Republic and the gold, oil, timber, and gas in Romania are seen as wealth that 
might sustain the national economy in the uncertain times ahead while helping to 
provide work for economically depressed areas. Citizens who live in areas where 
houses are threatened opposed this economic model and the urban middle classes and 
ecological associations feared the impact of these industries on the natural habitat. 
 
 
5. Roșia Montană, a little village that sits on top of a gold mine 
After the transition, Romania remained economically weak for a long time. Severely 
affected by the global economic crisis, its GDP fell more than 7% in 2009, forcing the 
Romanian government to request a $26 billion IMF emergency assistance package. 
Following this, the Romanian government adopted drastic austerity measures, 
resulting in a further reduction in GDP of 1.3% in 2010. Although the economy has 
grown quickly since then, Romania still lags behind its more affluent European 
counterparts and has the highest inequality in the EU. The rising investments only 
partially placate its citizens’ demands for better public services, new infrastructure, and 
higher wages. In a context of rising prices of gold and rare metals, Romania seemed to 
find an alternative source of income in its abundant natural resources—petroleum, 
timber, natural gas, coal, iron, and gold. Likewise, the Australian mining boom has 
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spared the country from the economic downturn. Romanian natural resources were 
supposed to help kick-start a broader economic recovery. 
Perhaps the largest of these extraction projects for both its scope and the reaction it 
provoked from the Romanian population was the proposed re-opening of a gold mine 
in the hills of Roșia Montană. Canadian company Gabriel Resources negotiated with 
the Romanian government and won the right to extract gold from an old mine in Roșia 
Montană using cyanide. According to the investors and the government, the project 
was expected to realize a profit of 7.5 billion, and several billion euro for the state in 
taxes, create jobs in the longtime depressed local economy, and provide future funding 
for local communities (McDonald-Gibson 2013). In 2013, a significant part of Romanian 
civil society protested against this project, the protest becoming the largest 
mobilization since the fall of Communism. 
Apart from the company’s optimistic prognostics for profit and revenues for the 
state, there were also voices who argued that Romania would benefit little. The initial 
deal granted the government a royalty rate of 6% and increased its stake to 25%, but 
potentially implied enormous costs to cover environmental cleanup (Balcaninsight.com 
2013). Moreover, the mine would mean destroying four forested mountains and the 
potential contamination of local rivers and fragile ecosystems. If the mine opened, the 
company would have to force the relocation of residents from three villages, which 
would be razed to the ground, to extract 350 tons of gold and 1500 tons of silver. For 
this purpose, the company created a shared venture with the state called the Roșia 
Montană Gold Corporation (RMGC) (Balcaninsight.com 2013). 
Despite the problems outlined, the economic incentives for the extraction and 
investors’ pressure on the government were high. This is showed by a radical shift in 
the stance of the governing party. At first, the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Victor 
Ponta, was a vehement opponent of the project, but he changed his mind after he 
became Prime Minister in 2013 (Bayerle and Olteanu 2016). He argued that not going 
ahead with the project “would be a catastrophe for Romania” as it “would be a 
negative signal to foreign investors.” Shortly after, the government declared the 
project to be of national interest and quickly proposed new legislation that would allow 
RMGC to unilaterally force land buyouts (HotNewsRo 2013). Victor Ponta declared that 
“if Parliament decides not to support this project, Romania would give the message 
that we are against foreign investors, against the exploitation of our potential, and this 
would be a disaster for Romania (HotNewsRo 2013).” He said in English at the Eastern 
Europe Investment Summit, organized by Reuters, that Roșia Montană was a critical 
project, symbolizing what was to come, “We must take advantage of our natural 
resources, of course respecting all environmental standards, but if they are respected, 
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we should be in favor of exploration” (HotNewsRo 2013). Romania’s Prime Minister 
acknowledged that the Roșia Montană project was a controversial one, but urged his 
supporters in parliament “to prove once again that Romania does not deny its right to 
development” (HotNewsRo 2013). This shift in government position shows the 
existence of the commodities consensus and of extractivism in Romania and the 
vulnerability of political elite to global pressures exerted by companies and investors. 
Likewise, the local political and administrative elites were supportive of the RMGC 
project because it would harness economic resources and bring jobs to the severely 
economically deprived area. According to reports by activists, local authorities 
complied fully with RMGC’s demands and produced and very quickly approved urban 
plans that permitted the conversion of the rural area into an industrial zone (Marica 
2013; Bayerle and Olteanu 2016). However, such prioritization of one economic sector 
made any alternative financial strategies virtually impossible. Many local citizens 
highlighted conflicts of interest as some of the councilors or their family members were 
allegedly on RMGC’s payroll (Boros and Barr 2013). In this way, the same kind of 
economic dependence is reproduced at local levels, where large and controlling 
companies in small communities frequently use their structural power to dominate the 
government and impose their private interests (Mares, Muntean, and Petrova 2016). 
 
From a local campaign to a nationwide protest 
 
The Roșia Montană project prompted a myriad of social conflicts and protests. The 
local people were confronted by a dilemma. The project planned to create several 
hundred jobs, a considerable attraction in an impoverished mining region where few 
other alternatives existed (Bayerle and Olteanu 2016). Some residents sold their 
property to RMGC, either willingly or under duress, and moved to modern new 
settlements provided by the company on the outskirts of the largest nearby city, Alba 
Iulia. Pressure was then put on those who were unwilling to leave. Over 100 citizens 
stayed and mounted resistance. As a result, the community began to fracture, and 
whole families fell out over their differences as to whether to stay or relocate (Bayerle 
and Olteanu 2016). Two movements emerged, locals and miners who were in favor of 
instigating the mining, and those against, who wanted more ecologically sustainable 
development. Those already working in the industry supported the extension of mining 
activities by referring to Câmpeni as a historic mining town and to RMGC as the only 
investor and job provider in a local economy with high unemployment. 
Those who refused to sell their properties formed a group and received support 
from the Open Society Foundations and the university in Cluj-Napoca to spread the 
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protests across the country and to the Western media. Under the banner “Save Roșia 
Montană,” a large number of residents of Câmpeni (one of the towns threatened by 
the mine) gathered in the town center to protest (Dale-Harris 2013). The activists 
claimed that the project would cause an environmental disaster and threaten the 
ancient Roman archeological sites. They also maintained that it would return all assets 
and profits to the Canadian company, whereas Romania would bear all the ecological 
damage (Preda 2016; Velicu and Kaika 2017). 
Nevertheless, the protests started to gather pace after 2013, when Ponta’s 
government was prepared to pass a piece of legislation that would give RMGC the 
preferential right to issue compulsory purchase orders to the residents who refused to 
sell their houses and lands. The draft law also set time limits for the state authorities to 
grant all permits, regardless of potential infringements of national legislation or court 
rulings (Dale-Harris 2013; Bayerle and Olteanu 2016). The protests quickly spread from 
Cluj-Napoca to towns and cities across the country, recruiting thousands of people in 
Bucharest and in Cluj-Napoca itself. The “Save Roșia Montană” campaign became at 
that time the largest social movement in Romania since the 1989 revolution. In 2013, 
several thousands of protesters marched across the largest cities, including Bucharest, 
Cluj-Napoca, Iași, and Brașov. The protesters marched holding signs with slogans such 
as, “Save Roșia Montană,” “The corporation doesn’t make the legislation,” and 
“Corruption equals Cyanide,” and called for the government to withdraw the new 
legislation (Bayerle and Olteanu 2016; Preda 2016). 
Although all social strata were present, a vast majority of the protesters were young 
educated professionals (Poenaru 2013). Whereas the environmental claim was 
strongest within civil rights groups, the young urban classes concentrated more on 
opposing the corrupt government and administration, which could easily be bought by 
the interests of large national and multinational companies (UBB academic 2017). This 
wider frame also appeared in the media. “We do not want to sell our country for free 
to foreigners. We have a corrupted government that is not listening to our opinions,” 
declared several protestors to the Western media (Dunlop 2012; The Economist 2013), 
and the comment below appeared in the national and international media: 
 
Our government has used its position to exploit and not care for its citizens. This is 
not an issue the majority of people agree with. A private company is being given 
power in a way that is unheard of through a private contract between the state and 
this company. (Wong 2013) 
 
My interview in Bucharest (Former opposition politician 2017) confirmed that the 
anti-corruption dimension further magnified the scope of the protests, attracting more 
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adherents, who had paid little if any attention to ecology before this. For these 
protesters, the whole case was symptomatic of a corrupt political class who colluded 
with economic interests. 
On 14 June 2014, parliament bowed to public pressure and rejected the RMGC bill. 
In 2016, the Minister of Culture vowed to put an end to gold mining using cyanide and 
declared Roșia Montană to be a historic site of national interest, thereby prohibiting all 
drilling in the area. He also urged the National Anticorruption Directorate to investigate 
the entire RMGC deal. However, as Europe struggles with slow economic growth, 
Romania is not the only country considering turning to its natural resources to try and 
boost income. Greece is facing a similar battle over a gold mine and both Italy and 
Spain have approved controversial oil extraction projects. In addition, the Czech 
Republic is deciding what energy policies should be pursued in the future and has 
initiated a discussion about the future of coal supplies and certain rare materials. 
 
 
6. Czech Republic: Horní Jiřetín, like a dog in the manger 
In 2013, President Miloš Zeman and the Minister of Industry publicly suggested the 
abolition of the ecological limits for brown coal mining established in 1991 in the north 
of the country (Lukáš 2015; lidovky.cz 2013). These limits guaranteed that residential 
areas would not be demolished due to mining. As impermeable boundaries, they 
needed to protect both nature and the transport infrastructure of the North Bohemian 
brown coal basin. Mining companies, however, have never given up wishing to extract 
coal from under the residential communities here. As far back as 1994, Mostecká 
uhelná (Most Coal Group) prepared a study of the demolition of Horní Jiřetín and 
Černice, villages that were sitting on 280 million tons of brown coal. Despite several 
protests against the mining, the Social government decided in 2015 to abolish the 
limits but to spare the village of Horní Jiřetín, which would be immediately threatened 
by the mining operation. The reasons given were mostly economic. 
The traumatic practice of population displacement due to the extraction of natural 
resources is nothing new in Czech history. Since 1955, more than 80 municipalities, 
including the medieval city of Most that has monuments dating from the 13th century, 
have been razed to the ground or moved due to coal extraction. In the early 1990s, the 
last victim of the mining activity was the town of Libkovice. After the fall of the 
Communist regime, successive governments tried to balance the plans of mining 
companies and corporations on the one hand with the interests of local people and the 
environment on the other. In 1991, the government established the mining limits with 
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the purposes of guaranteeing safety to local communities and allowing for alternative 
economic development. During the financial crisis, the government several times 
opened up the possibility of breaching the limits. 
In 2015, the Social Democratic coalition government proposed breaching the limits 
of brown coal mining in North Bohemia, which at the worst would have meant the 
demolition of the villages of Horní Jiřetín and Černice. The government’s original 
project counted on breaking limits in two mines: Bílina (owned by a national company, 
ČEZ) and ČSA, which was privatized and in the hands of a Czech millionaire and 
Mostecká uhelná společnost7 (Most Coal Group). If the limits were to be exceeded at 
the ČSA mine, Horní Jiřetín would have to be demolished.8 There would also be a 
significant threat to some parts of the town of Litvínov, where the extraction would 
encroach on houses at a distance of 500 m. In addition, the new boundary of the mine 
would be very near the city of Most. Some experts argued, however, that the coal 
reserves under Horní Jiřetín were not worthy of such costs (iDNES.cz 2015c). 
The Czech government adopted a positive but cautious stance on the issue of mining 
limits. The Czech government was not unanimously inclined to support the drilling. 
Some ministers expressed publicly their reservations (Horák 2015). Already, in 2012, 
the previous government had decided to amend the Mining Laws and remove the 
expropriation paragraphs facilitating expropriation in favor of mining companies. On 
the contrary, the government wanted to retain control of this strategic natural 
resource (iDNES.cz 2014; Rovenský 2015). Its main concerns were the economic 
situation and the development of commodity and energy prices on the global market. 
The Prime Minister reported in the media that economic reasons weighed heavily and 
that supporting employment was an important issue during the decision-making 
process. The government was especially concerned with energetic autonomy and 
economic losses on the part of the mine owners and, of course, large job losses in the 
city of Most (a city with a high unemployment rate of 13% in a country with a rate of 
less than 5%) (Novinky.cz 2015). The government feared that according to analyses of 
ČEZ (a partly state-owned energy and electric company), which predicted that coal 
supply for small consumers and heating plants would be compromised by 2022.  
Coal mining in the area also had vociferous supporters, especially among the unions, 
mining companies, and miners, who cited the economic benefits for the region and the 
 
7 Mostecká uhelná společnost or Most Coal Group company is private mining and electric com-
pany.  
8 If Černice and Horní Jiřetín were demolished, the mining companies would acquire another 
approximately 255 million tons of brown coal and the mines would absorb an additional 25 km2 
of land. 
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jobs that the revival of mining would bring to a region with high unemployment. As in 
Roșia Montană, the pro-mining camp, which was composed of unions and miners, also 
staged protests in the local area and before the government, in which they argued for 
the right to maintain their employment and underlined the lack of alternatives in the 
region. Their banners carried slogans such as “Coal employs and heats” and “Coal 
warms up a million households” (Mikulka 2015; ČTK 2015a). 
Moreover, the local chamber of industry and commerce sided with the miners. The 
president of the Confederation of Industry of the Czech Republic, Jaroslav Hanák, said 
to the media (Lidovky.cz 2015; ČTK 2015b), 
 
The Government does not have the political courage to say clearly and honestly to 
citizens who currently live on the reserves of strategic raw materials that these 
people should move because [coal] is part of the national wealth. We think that we 
should use our national wealth and not sit on it like a dog in the manger. 
 
Jaroslav Hanák also called for a swift, positive decision on the limits, “As a federation 
of industry, we support the Ministry of Industry’s proposal that the decision should be 
reached as soon as possible” (Lidovky.cz 2015). According to the ČEZ’s spokesmen, the 
mines were supplying cheap heat for four million people in the Czech Republic. The 
end of coal from the ČSA mine might mean the end of affordable heat for half of 
Prague and other towns and businesses (Novinky.cz 2015; iDNES.cz 2015b). 
Not surprisingly, local associations, Greenpeace, and local political parties had a 
different view. The head of the Greenpeace energy campaign (Greenpeace.org 2015) 
declared in a public statement: 
 
The debate about the limits is absurd. The government has been deciding whether 
to destroy one city and to move a thousand people so that we can remain the third 
largest exporter of electricity in Europe. We are exporting more electricity than 
all the Czech households put together consume at home. 
 
The mayor of Horní Jiřetín argued for the need to think about an alternative 
economic model for the region: 
 
The development of this territory cannot constantly be subordinated to the 
economy of mining companies. We cannot solve the employment of northern 
Bohemia by prolonging the life of the quarries but by restructuring the existing heavy 
industry and supporting economic activities with higher added value. (Greenpeace.org 
2015) 
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Local communities and fading resistance 
 
Horní Jiřetín and Černice are relatively large villages, each having about 2000 
inhabitants. As in Câmpeni, the community is against the proposed mining. In 2005, 
Horní Jiřetín organized a referendum in which large majority of the population 
supported the existence of limits and did not want to move out or sell their land 
(iDNES.cz 2015a). However, since then, the situation has changed and the economic 
pressure from the mining company with regard to purchasing houses, the uncertainty 
that negatively affects the local economy, and lack of state investment have slowly 
eroded the local feeling of unity in the village. As a result, many locals have moved out 
(iDNES.cz 2015a). The city of Most, a mining community with 70,000 inhabitants near 
to Horní Jiřetín and with the highest unemployment rate in the country, wants both 
mines to remain open. The mayor of Most, Jan Paparega, said in the media (Gordíková 
2015), “We are disappointed with the government’s approach. The members of the 
current government visited the city of Most, and they saw that we need a solution for 
the economic situation of the city. Coal is a strategic resource.” The Green Party, 
Greenpeace and environmental organizations, on the other hand, helped the local 
community to organize events, information campaigns, and protests (iDNES.cz 2015b). 
Despite the general support of the Czech population, the issue has remained a problem 
of ecology (Trachtová 2014). 
Compared to the “Save Roșia Montană” mobilization, in the Czech Republic, the 
protests were only episodic. The most active segments were academic institutions (the 
Academy of Science, for example) and environmental organizations that organized 
several events and protest actions. However, they failed to attract broader support 
across Czech society. According to reports in the media, around 3000 people 
participated in the nationwide “We are the limits” campaign. Several direct actions, sit-
ins, and protests took place in 22 cities, some with less than 100 participants (Česká 
televize 2015). In 2015, the government decided on an extension of the mining limits 
that would spare (at least for now) the village of Horní Jiřetín and maintain extraction 
in the Bílina mine. After five years, the future of Horní Jiřetín can be considered again 
(Mikulka 2015). 
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7. Discussion and conclusion 
 
First, this paper aimed to investigate protests against extractive industries in two 
localities in two countries, Câmpeni and Horní Jiřetín, in Romania and the Czech 
Republic, respectively, which have recently reconsidered applying extraction politics to 
their natural resources. In so doing, the paper has applied the framework developed by 
Cini et al. (2017) that links the processes of accumulation and capitalist transformation 
with the emergence of movements. By linking the accumulation dynamics and 
mobilization processes, these protests can be interpreted as being the result of new 
modes of accumulation by dispossession. This characterization of the protests seems to 
better account for their timing, diverse claims, composition, and their juxtaposition 
with traditional labor movements and unions. These protests attracted participants 
from environmental and social movements, workers, and people from both the rural 
and urban population. In addition, their claims shared a common concern that 
illustrates the cross-over between the defense of the local community and its 
environment, and alternative economic development and the commons. 
Second, this paper has examined how other contextual factors contribute to shaping 
the conditions from which the mobilization processes emerge. Whereas in the Czech 
case a more coordinated organization of the economy allowed accommodation of 
some of the claims through institutional means, in the case of Romania, the high risk of 
the government being dominated by the economic interests of large multinational 
companies produced the broad framing of these protests, including an anti-corruption 
frame that resonated well with Romanian society, helping the movement to spread 
more widely and resulting in its becoming a greater threat to the government. 
Third, an interesting finding emerging from following the new framework is that 
both types of movements—those emerging from the process of accumulation by 
dispossession and those derived from the process of accumulation in production—can 
be present simultaneously. Moreover, they can also be opposed to each other, for 
example in the case of miners and unions supporting industrial development at the 
same time as they were confronting the local movements that were opposing 
extraction in their area. This finding adds more nuances to the research on anti-
austerity movements by showing that where the economic models are adjusting or are 
in crisis, several types of social movements can emerge. 
Finally, although the protest campaign in Romania could be considered as successful, 
this type of mobilization can also have adverse consequences. It can create a dynamic 
of scandals and protests that are not reflected in participation by the electorate or in 
the final policies adopted by the government. Likewise, movements calling for the 
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alternative economic use of land can push extraction to new frontiers and impose new 
ways of dispossession. Future research on extractivism could, therefore, focus on the 
relationship between extraction and movements against dispossession in more general 
terms. One of the promising avenues for research in this field could be the processes of 
gentrification and extraction of value from urban spaces (Mezzadra and Neilson 2017). 
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